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Abstract 
 
Brands not only enhance the positive impact of marketing initiatives, but also buffer the firm 
from the full consequences of unexpected and negative market shifts. While this protective effect 
has been demonstrated for firm-specific events (e.g., product recalls, public relations crises), its 
impact has not been observed in response to market-wide environmental shifts. Our study 
demonstrates the buffering properties of strong brands in exactly such a context: the passing of 
new legislation. By examining responses to the introduction of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 
we show that (1) firms exhibit a rapid and homogeneous response as they comply and adjust 
strategy to a new environmental incentive/cost structure; (2) from a marketing perspective, this 
homogeneity in competitive responses leads to a systemic decrease in marketing efficiency; and 
(3) stronger brands existing prior to this environmental shift help buffer their companies from 
this loss in efficiency. We further show that this advantage only holds for the strongest of brands 
in the market. 
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The Buffering Effect of Brands for Companies Facing Legislative Homogenization: 
Evidence from the Introduction of Sarbanes-Oxley 
Felipe Thomaz, Leonce Bargeron, John Hulland, and Chad Zutter1 
 
Strong brands have been shown to often be catalytic in nature, enhancing the positive effects of 
other marketing initiatives. Furthermore, brands can ameliorate the negative impact of 
undesirable situations, such as service failures (Zboja and Vorhees 2006), negative publicity 
(Ahluwalia, Burnkrant, and Unnava 2000), and product recalls (Cleeren, Dekimpe, and Helsen 
2008; Kalaignanam, Kushwaha, and Meike Eilert 2013). Given this joint benefit of both 
reinforcing positive and dampening negative firm consequences, as well as their own direct 
positive effects on firm outcomes, it is not at all surprising that “building strong brands has 
become a top priority for many organizations” (Keller 2001, p. 1). Moreover, since many 
managers are risk averse, understanding when brands can be expected to attenuate the effects of 
negative outcomes is particularly important.  
 The vast majority of past research attempting to understand the buffering role played by 
brands in the face of negative events has been firm-specific (e.g., a firm’s recalled products, a 
firm’s service failures). While this work is important, it does not assess the potential power of 
brands to soften the negative consequences of broader environmental shifts (i.e., systematic 
rather than firm-specific effects). Notably, studies considering the role of marketing assets in 
protecting the firm and investors from systematic equity risk have led to diverging findings. 
While Rego, Billet, and Morgan (2009) find that strong brands can protect the firm from 
                                                 
1 The authors acknowledge the support of the Darla Moore School of Business, the Gatton College of Business and 
Economics, the Terry College of Business, the Joseph M. Katz Business School, and the John H. Schnatter Institute 
for the Study of Free Enterprise. 
 4 
downside systematic equity risk, Bharadwaj, Tuli, and Bonfrer (2011) conclude instead that 
gains in brand quality may increase systematic risk. While restricted to the firm’s economic 
environment, these studies are evidence that brands can alter the firm’s exposure to market-wide 
environmental shifts, for better or worse. In this paper, we examine the impact of a different 
environment’s systematic shift on firms’ marketing performance—the introduction of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the United States in 2002—highlighting how this type of systematic 
shock impacts the firm’s marketing efficiency. 
It is difficult to overstate the impact of the environment on the firm. First, the firm’s 
ability to adapt and respond to its external environment has been considered as equivalent to the 
process of strategic management itself (Chakravarthy 1982). Second, depending on the 
theoretical perspective, the environment has been said to either influence or totally determine 
firm conduct (Hunt and Morgan 1995). In this context, Hunt and Morgan (1995, p. 12) 
emphasize that “a firm’s comparative advantage in resources can be neutralized by the actions of 
consumers, government, or competitors . . . governmental action can destroy the value-creating 
potential of a resource through law or regulation.” Ironically, legislative change is the 
environmental change factor most likely to be met with minimal resistance from managers—and 
thus result in the fastest behavioral adjustment (DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Scott 1997). Given 
the frictionless, systemic (rather than targeted), and potentially negative nature of governmental 
action, as well as the general importance of environmental factors for firm conduct, our review 
leads us to consider the following question: Can a strong brand buffer the firm from negative 
consequences arising from government-driven environmental change? 
In this paper, we aim to answer this question by showing that (1) governmental action 
through new legislation elicits a rapid and homogeneous response from firms as they comply and 
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adjust strategy to a new environmental incentive/cost structure; (2) from a marketing perspective, 
this homogeneity in competitive responses leads to a systemic decrease in marketing efficiency; 
and (3) stronger brands existing prior to this environmental shift help buffer companies from this 
loss in efficiency. Specifically, we examine how the introduction of the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act (SOX) and the associated effects on firms’ costs and incentive structures led to a shift in the 
relative emphasis that firms place on two critical marketing activities: value creation (e.g., 
developing and delivering new products) and value appropriation (e.g., extracting profits from 
existing products). Consistent with existing evidence in the finance and accounting literatures 
that SOX has diminished risk-taking within firms, we hypothesize and then identify a shift away 
from riskier investments in value-creating activities and toward less risky value appropriation. In 
light of this shift, we predict—and show—that firms experienced a decrease in marketing 
efficiency in response to this systemic incentive to engage in value appropriation activities. 
Finally, we provide evidence demonstrating that previous marketing investments in brand equity 
undertaken by the firm can help protect it from this negative consequence. 
We begin with a discussion of SOX and related research that finds decreased risk-taking 
in US firms resulting from this legislation, followed by an examination of the resulting resource 
allocation decision in which firms engaged (made evident by shifts in their strategic emphasis 
trajectories). We then introduce our methodology for this study, taking advantage of a naturally 
occurring quasi-experimental interrupted time series empirical design (Nunnally 1960), with the 
introduction of SOX serving as our “treatment.” Finally, we present our results followed by a 
discussion of their implications for marketing. 
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Sarbanes-Oxley 
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 was introduced in the wake of a series of accounting scandals 
involving companies such as Enron, WorldCom, and Adelphia. The apparent intent of this law 
was to prevent such scandals in the future and to restore investor confidence in the veracity of 
US financial markets by making firms’ directors personally responsible for corporate misdeeds 
and by requiring firms to establish, disclose, and assess internal control systems. However, its 
introduction has not gone without criticism. One recurring concern is that the combined 
requirements of compliance, along with potential criminal charges for noncompliance, have led 
to an environment that discourages investment in new projects, innovation, and risk-taking 
(Michaels 2003; Greenspan 2003). In a 2006 interview, economist and Nobel Prize winner 
Milton Friedman highlighted this concern, stating, “Sarbanes-Oxley says to every entrepreneur, 
‘For God’s sake don’t innovate. Don’t take chances because down will come the hatchet. We’re 
going to knock your head off’” (Gerstein 2006). 
A number of studies in accounting and finance have examined whether the introduction 
of SOX has increased the cost of risk and, therefore, decreased risk-taking by publicly traded US 
firms (Cohen, Dey, and Lys 2007; Shadab 2008; Bargeron, Lehn, and Zutter 2009). Their 
findings suggest that risk-taking has decreased in the period following SOX, as manifested by (1) 
decreased investment, (2) reduced standard deviations of stock returns (a measure of equity risk), 
and (3) increased levels of cash holdings. 
Two key clauses in the Sarbanes-Oxley legislation support this prediction of reduced 
risk-taking behavior by US firms. First, at the firm board level, SOX increases the role of 
independent directors while simultaneously introducing potential criminal charges for corporate 
misdeeds. Furthermore, both the chief executive and chief financial officers must certify the 
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veracity of their firm’s financial statements, once again facing potential criminal charges for any 
knowing or willful violation. These changes directly discourage the approval of risky activities, 
such as new product development and R&D, which entail specialized, project-specific 
knowledge that necessitates a greater investment of time throughout the corporate hierarchy to 
evaluate and monitor.  
Second, Section 404 of the legislation and the resulting SEC rules require firms to 
evaluate and disclose the adequacy of their internal controls and provide reasonable assurance 
that misstatements will be avoided or identified. Riskier investments entail greater uncertainty. 
Therefore, insofar as greater uncertainty requires more extensive testing and evaluation and is 
more likely to result in misstatements, these requirements impose greater costs on riskier 
investments. As a result, risky investments—already discouraged by boardroom composition and 
the criminalization of misdeeds—are further discouraged by Section 404. 
It is important to recognize that SOX legislation does not directly impose regulation on 
the marketing function. Thus, any shifts in efficiency that result from the introduction of the new 
law should reflect the homogeneous strategic use of marketing discussed below, rather than any 
direct change in allowable marketing initiatives. Obviously, it is not always the case that 
legislation has no direct bearing on marketing operation. For example, the Robinson-Patman Act 
of 1936 (Pub. L. No. 74-692, 49 Stat. 1526; Luchs et al. 2010), as well as the Public Health 
Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969 (Bates 1969), had direct implications for marketing management 
by amending antitrust law to include provisions against discriminatory pricing and by prohibiting 
firms from advertising tobacco products on television and the radio (respectively). In these latter 
situations, it would be necessary to also consider shifts in the marketing mix. However, such is 
not the case for examining the effects of SOX. 
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Hypotheses 
Strategic marketing emphasis 
The trade-off between exploration (identifying and developing innovative products) and 
exploitation (extracting profits from the market) has a long history in the strategic management 
domain (March 1991). An extreme emphasis on either activity at the expense of the other can be 
suboptimal: excessive exploration can lead to an accrual of too many costs without the 
realization of accompanying benefits, while too much focus on exploitation leads to a shallow 
position of underdeveloped ideas and a lack of competitive distinction in the longer run. 
More recently, this tension has evolved into a contrast between “value creation” and 
“value appropriation” (Mizik and Jacobson 2003), serving as mechanisms through which 
marketing brings value to the firm. Value creation represents a strategy of innovation, where a 
steady flow of innovative products maintains a long term firm advantage, but also entails more 
risk. Value appropriation represents a lower risk strategy of extracting profits while maintaining 
the firm’s current advantage by introducing competitive barriers (e.g., strong brands). The 
concept of strategic marketing emphasis, as introduced by Mizik and Jacobson (2003, p. 65), 
describes the relative interplay between these two alternatives as “complements and imperfect 
substitutes.” They further note that while “value creation influences the potential magnitude of 
[an] advantage; value appropriation influences the amount of the advantage the firm is able to 
capture and the length of time the advantage persists.” Most firms combine value creation and 
value appropriation activities; a firm’s strategic marketing emphasis reflects its relative emphasis 
on value creation versus value appropriation. 
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It is important to note that new product launches—typically attended by large 
commercialization expenditures—are part of value appropriation, not value creation. When firms 
focus on the latter, they invest in asset creation (generally in the form of R&D) prior to 
introducing those assets (products) into the market. In doing so, these firms are following a 
strategy of innovation with an eye toward the development of a strong portfolio of future 
products. Once marketing investments (e.g., demand creation, branding) for a specific product 
begin, however, the firm has shifted its emphasis for this product from value creation to value 
appropriation. 
While previous research has shown that strategic marketing emphasis varies by firm and 
industry (Mizik and Jacobson 2003), our contention is that a shift in the amount of institutionally 
induced environmental risk has a systematic effect on the relative strategic marketing emphasis 
of all firms. The introduction of SOX increased perceived environmental risk (both at the 
personal and corporate levels). This increased risk affected both financial and marketing 
decision-making within firms. From the financial perspective, firms reduced their investment in 
riskier R&D activities and increased their cash holdings (e.g., Bargeron, Lehn, and Zutter 2009). 
What we are proposing here is that SOX also shifted firms’ relative marketing emphases away 
from value creation (i.e., R&D investment) and toward value appropriation (e.g., advertising). 
Thus, both the financial and marketing decisions undertaken by firms in the post-SOX period 
demonstrate a desire to shift away from riskier R&D investment and toward lower risk 
alternatives (e.g., cash, value appropriation). Empirical evidence for the financial shift away 
from R&D has already been provided (Cohen, Dey, and Lys 2007; Shadab 2008; Bargeron, 
Lehn, and Zutter 2009). In contrast, the corresponding marketing shift has not been previously 
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studied. We argue that firms, in fact, increase investment in the form of increased value 
appropriation. 
Using a cost-benefit framework, and recognizing that SOX did not materially change the 
benefits received by firms, it follows that the perceived cost increases introduced by SOX likely 
drove shifts in both firm- and individual-level behaviors. At the firm level, SOX increased the 
relative cost of risky investment without increasing the relative benefit.2 This shift was 
exacerbated by the personal cost-benefit analysis of executives and directors who now face 
increased criminal liability. Thus, firms’ managers likely shifted their relative emphases away 
from value creation in response to the higher cost of risk it entails, and toward value 
appropriation initiatives with lower attendant risks. In other words, although legislation 
attempting to increase transparency and oversight of firms may not necessarily increase the 
relative cost of risk, the specific structure of the regulations and penalties legislated in SOX does 
decrease incentives for risk-taking. As such, SOX increased the perceived cost of value creation 
relative to value appropriation, and we expect to see that firms shifted their strategic marketing 
emphases toward value appropriation and away from value creation following the introduction of 
SOX. Thus: 
H1 Firms will on average shift to a greater strategic marketing emphasis on 
value appropriation (versus value creation) following the introduction of 
SOX. 
 
                                                 
2 Although a decrease in risky investment by other firms as a result of the increased cost of risky investment from 
SOX might increase the marginal benefit of risk-taking for a focal firm in an equilibrium analysis, aggregate risk-
taking would still be lower after SOX. We do not hypothesize that every US firm will decrease risk-taking, but that 
on average US firms will do so. Similarly, we do not hypothesize that multisegment firms will pursue the same 
pattern across all segments. Managers will determine how to spread the adjustments to risk-taking across segments 
depending on the relative costs and benefits of risk within each segment’s industry. 
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Marketing efficiency 
For firms with set or constrained marketing budgets, the increased risk associated with value 
creation, as described above, will shift resources toward value appropriation. As a result, 
investment in marketing actions increases, with brand-building advertising being a foremost 
example (Mizik and Jacobson 2003). One potential consequence of increased marketing 
spending, however, is a decline in marketing efficiency. Marketing efficiency is the ratio of a 
firm’s marketing performance (outputs) to the inputs consumed in its generation (Vorhies and 
Morgan 2003). Thus, marketing efficiency is maximized when the firm realizes greater gains 
(usually in terms of revenues) with the minimum necessary amount of associated costs.  
If we consider an individual firm, the shock provided by SOX should lead it to increase 
its relative level of marketing spending, as argued earlier. Further, due to the separation of 
finance and marketing decisions within the firm, total expenditures on marketing (R&D plus 
marketing expense) are likely to be somewhat “sticky” from one year to the next. (“Stickiness” 
refers to the resistance on the part of marketing managers to decrease marketing expenditures. 
This resistance stems from any private information they have about the effectiveness of 
marketing expenditures as well as self-interest in keeping their budgets large.) As a result of this 
stickiness, a decrease in R&D spending coupled with a desire on the part of a firm’s marketing 
department to retain as large a budget as possible for next year will lead to an increase in 
marketing expense (e.g., more advertising).3 The firm might anticipate that this will lead to an 
                                                 
3 For our main result, we do not require stickiness because we examine relative—rather than absolute—marketing 
expenditure. Given our main result, stickiness is only one way to ensure increased marketing spending after SOX. In 
fact, so long as capital rationing exists within the firm, then spending on marketing will increase after SOX. For 
example, if before SOX the firm is capital rationed, then the marginal utility of R&D spending > 0 and the marginal 
utility of marketing spending > 0 [MU(R&D) = MU(Marketing) > 0 in equilibrium]. After the SOX shock, which 
increases the marginal cost of R&D, R&D spending will go down and marketing spending will increase until, in 
equilibrium, the new marginal utilities are once again equal. The marginal utilities of each will be lower after SOX 
than before SOX.  
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increase in the revenues it generates, leaving the firm’s marketing efficiency at some new level 
that is dependent on firm, market, and industry idiosyncrasies. However, this shift in marketing 
spending is not happening in isolation. As a broad-based legislative change, SOX can be 
expected to have a systematic impact on all firms, regardless of industry. What, then, is the net 
impact on an individual firm’s marketing efficiency? 
To more concretely illustrate this effect of SOX, we focus the following discussion on 
advertising expenditures, but our arguments apply equally to other forms of marketing 
expenditures as well. Previous research has shown that increasing the number of competing 
brands advertising in a market and/or the amount they spend on advertising will decrease a focal 
firm’s share of voice, thereby undermining consumers’ ability to recall information from ads 
(Keller 1987; Burke and Srull 1988). This results in reduced effectiveness of the focal firm’s 
advertising, ultimately diminishing its revenues. Furthermore, competitive advertisement has 
been argued to “provide information that serves to dissipate [a firm’s] isolating mechanisms,” or 
its ability to appropriate value through activities like brand-based advertising (Mizik and 
Jacobson 2003, p. 66). 
In response, marketing managers typically adjust their advertising expenditures so that 
“their messages can be heard through the noise” (Little 1979, p. 1). Thus, as competitive 
advertising increases, the focal firm must also increase its advertising expenditures in order to 
maintain an equal amount of “above noise” exposure (i.e., to maintain a parity share of voice in 
its market).  
Taken together, these observations suggest that with the introduction of SOX, firms are 
likely to increase their advertising spending, both as a direct response to SOX and as a 
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competitive response.4 The result of this, however, will be a reduction in advertising 
effectiveness. Of course, this loss of effectiveness does not need to be restricted to the 
advertising domain. Competitive reaction can also happen as a result of changes in other 
marketing instruments, such as price, product features, and promotions (e.g., Leeflang and 
Wittink 1992, 1996). More generally:  
H2 Firms will, on average, experience lower levels of marketing efficiency 
following the introduction of SOX versus the preceding period. 
 
Although H2 represents our overall prediction for firms in general, previous research also 
indicates that brand familiarity plays a crucial role in improving brand and advertising recall in 
cluttered advertising environments (Kent and Allen 1993). For example, Keller (1993) argues 
that customer-based brand equity represents the differential effect of brand knowledge on 
consumer responses to brand-related marketing expenditures. This advantage has been noted in 
past research on responses to advertising, demonstrating that consumers with positive 
predispositions toward a brand require fewer exposures to a marketing message, and less 
reinforcement, in order to meet the brand’s communication objectives (Ray 1982; Rossiter and 
Percy 1987). From this perspective, it follows that for strong brands (i.e., those with strong, 
positive brand equity), brand-based advertising (and other marketing investments) will be more 
effective than the advertising of weaker competitors who do not have the same levels of brand 
awareness and image.  
                                                 
4 In fact, observations on American firms around the introduction of SOX corroborate this notion. While the average 
reported advertising expense decreased by 2.3 percent from 2000 to 2001 (or $0.83 million less for the average firm 
in those years), it increased by 11.76 percent from 2001 to 2002 (or an additional $4 million on average), the year 
that SOX was introduced. In a longer window, examining the decade preceding and following SOX, we observe that 
the average firm advertising expense reported in the post-SOX era was 52 percent higher than those reported in the 
pre-SOX period (this is $17 million more per year for the average firm). 
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This differential efficacy of advertising suggests that an ongoing firm strategy of 
investing in brand equity could serve as a protective measure against an eventual risk-increasing 
legislative change, such as the introduction of SOX. As argued earlier, the introduction of SOX 
provides a systematic incentive for firms to advertise as a means to appropriate value, thus 
increasing the clutter of advertising and ultimately reducing the efficiency of marketing 
investment. However, a firm that enters into this environment with higher brand equity should 
expect a greater “probability of brand choice, as well as greater consumer loyalty, and decreased 
vulnerability to competitive marketing actions” (Keller 1993, p. 8). The benefit of greater a priori 
investment in brand equity for marketing efficiency, then, should be double-barreled: first 
through the increased efficacy of the brand’s own advertising, and second through a reduction in 
the effectiveness of competitive advertising spending. Thus:  
H3 Firms that invested in brand-building activities prior to the introduction of 
SOX will have higher levels of marketing efficiency than other firms 
following the introduction of SOX. 
 
Method 
Data Sources and Firm Sample 
Financial accounting and stock data were gathered from Compustat and CRSP, respectively, 
while data on annual growth rate in gross domestic product (GDP) were collected for each year 
from the International Monetary Fund’s website.  
The sample used in this study is in the form of a panel consisting of 17 annual 
observations per firm, running from 1994 to 2010 (inclusive) and providing nine years of 
observations prior to the enactment of SOX in 2002 plus an additional eight years of post-SOX 
enactment observations. We use this time frame to capture both firms’ pre-SOX investment 
tendencies and firms’ adjustments to the enactment of SOX. A total of 1,441 firms (939 in the 
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United States and 502 in the United Kingdom), representing 52 different industries (as 
determined by two-digit SIC codes, excluding financials and utilities due to their highly 
regulated behavior) are included in our study.5 By virtue of falling outside of SOX jurisdiction, 
the UK-based firms serve as our control group for the analyses that follow. 
 
Measures 
Dependent Variables 
Strategic Marketing Emphasis. Our first dependent variable is a measure of the firm’s strategic 
marketing emphasis, representing the firm’s strategic choice between the creation and the 
appropriation of value (Mizik and Jacobson 2003; Swaminathan, Murshed, and Hulland 2009). 
This conceptualization has the advantage of capturing actual (rather than declared) firm strategy 
(Harrison, Hall, and Nargundkar 1993). Furthermore, it can be assessed using secondary data, 
rather than requiring primary data collection. Specifically, we calculate strategic marketing 
emphasis (for firm i at time t) as follows: 
  SMEti = (Marketing Spending Intensityti – R&Dti) / Assetsti  
 (1) 
Following previous research (Mizik and Jacobson 2007; Luo 2008; Chakravarty and 
Grewal 2012), we use a firm’s selling and general administrative (SGA) expenses minus its 
R&D expenses as a proxy for the firm’s marketing spending intensity. While this initially may 
seem odd, by removing the R&D component of SGA, we are left with a more complete measure 
of marketing investment, which includes items such as promotions and sales force costs as well 
                                                 
5 This includes all US-based firms in Compustat that reported non-zero R&D investment for the time frame of 
interest. Firms with no R&D expenditures across the entire 17-year time period were excluded. Firms reporting 
fewer than 12 years of data or less than $75 million in assets (to which SOX does not apply) were also excluded. 
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as advertising. While SGA has been used in past research as the sole and unmodified proxy for 
marketing expenditure, this purified version of SGA also allows us to examine the strategic 
trade-off between marketing and R&D investments.6 As per Mizik and Jacobson’s (2003) 
original conceptualization, marketing spending intensity and R&D correspond to the firm’s use 
of a value appropriation and value creation emphasis, respectively. 
 
Marketing Efficiency. Our second dependent variable is a measure of the firm’s marketing 
efficiency, or its ability to convert marketing spending into revenues. Defined as the ratio of 
marketing performance outcomes to the resources consumed (Vorhies and Morgan 2003), we 
calculate marketing efficiency as: 
Marketing Efficiencyti = Salesti / Marketing Spending Intensityti  (2) 
The use of sales as a marketing performance indicator is appropriate as it reflects 
“enhanced values of the firm’s products in the minds of current and potential customers . . . [as 
well as being] crucial to building market share” (Dutta, Narasimhan, and Rajiv 1999, p. 552). 
Marketing spending intensity, as described previously, provides a holistic view of marketing 
effort by accounting for advertising, promotional, and selling efforts, representing the sales 
revenue value to the firm of a dollar spent on its marketing. 
 
Independent Variables 
Time-based SOX-related trend variables. Our main independent variables of interest are two 
trend variables created to indicate the period preceding the introduction of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
                                                 
6 Compustat includes R&D expense (XRD, item 46) as one of the components of the reported SGA (XSGA, item 
132). Thus, the former must be removed from SGA for the constructed marketing emphasis measure to be 
meaningful in capturing the intended trade-off between value creation and value appropriation. 
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legislation (1994–2001) and the period following its introduction (2003–2010). These variables 
are coded according to the scheme presented in table 1, which allows for the interpretation of the 
resulting coefficients as a linear rate of change in strategic emphasis for each of these periods 
(see Raudenbush and Bryk 2002, pp. 178–80). The advantage of this approach is that it allows 
for the existence of a single trend in strategic marketing emphasis behavior spanning the entire 
period of our study (1994–2010), but also for the possibility of a fundamental shift in strategic 
marketing emphasis between the pre- and post-SOX periods. We use 2002—the year that 
Sarbanes-Oxley was introduced as law—as the reference point. This facilitates our discussion of 
legislative interference as a potential source of disruption resulting in shifts in strategic emphasis. 
Furthermore, because SOX was passed in late July 2002, we define each year as August to July 
(e.g., the 2002 year begins on August 1, 2001, and ends on July 31, 2002).7 
 
Table 1: Coding Scheme for Piece-Wise Linear Model 
 
Year ‘94 ‘95 ‘96 ‘97 ‘98 ‘99 ‘00 ‘01 ‘02 ‘03 ‘04 ‘05 ‘06 ‘07 ‘08 ‘09 ‘10 
Pre-Sox −8 −7 −6 −5 −4 −3 −2 −1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Post-Sox 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
Notes: Interpretation of coefficients (πs): 
- The intercept reflects the firm’s strategic marketing emphasis (SME) in 2002, the year SOX was introduced (π0i). 
- The coefficient for the pre-SOX period shows the linear rate of change (growth rate) in SME for the period 
preceding SOX (π1i). 
- The coefficient for the post-SOX period shows the linear rate of change (growth rate) in SME for the period 
following SOX (π2i). 
 
 
Control Variables 
                                                 
7 As a robustness check, we have also used 2000, 2001, 2003, and 2004 as alternative reference years. We find that 
based on BIC and Pseudo-R2, models using 2002 and 2003 as the reference provide the best fit. The goodness of fit 
for models using 2003 as a reference year is not surprising given the long-term nature of the investments being 
discussed, such that some of the changes taking place in the firm spill over into the following year. For sake of 
brevity, and given that SOX was introduced in 2002, we discuss only the results from models using the 2002 
reference year. However, the 2003 reference year results are very similar. 
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Because H1 is based on risk-related arguments, it is important to control for other known 
variables that might also influence a firm’s risk-taking posture in order to isolate the effects of 
the SOX legislation. Consistent with previous studies looking at the effects of SOX (Cohen, Dey, 
and Lys 2007; Bargeron, Lehn, and Zutter 2009), we account for the following time-specific 
factors: the health of the economy; the levels of risk and opportunity in the financial markets; 
and the firm’s size, debt, and profitability. Each of these variables is mean-centered by firm. 
 
Firm Size. We use the number of employees (Compustat) as our measure of the firm’s size for 
each year the firm is present in the dataset.  
 
Debt. This measure is the ratio of a firm’s total debt to the average market value of assets. It 
serves as an additional indicator of the firm’s existing risk profile. The values of DEBT used in 
the model are both time- and firm-specific. 
EBIT. We use the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes to average book value of debt as our 
measure of the firm’s profitability, a factor that we expect to influence the firm’s resource 
allocation decisions, and that therefore could explicitly affect SME. The values of EBIT used in 
the model are both time- and firm-specific.  
 
Lagged Change in Gross Domestic Product. Measured as the percentage change in the country’s 
GDP for each year in the panel, we use this variable to control for the health of the economy, 
lagging the measure one and two years in order to capture its lingering effects. Each lagged 
version of this variable is a time-varying predictor; however, all firms in the US sample share the 
same values in any given period (and the same is true for all of the UK firms). 
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Index Returns. We utilize a stock index return of the S&P 500 for American firms and the FTSE 
100 for UK-based firms to account for existing levels of risk and opportunity in the financial 
markets, as well as a possible alternative explanation for strategic shifts, such as the economic 
recession of 2001. This is again a common value that varies by year across all firms within the 
US or UK markets. 
 
USA. This is an indicator variable with a value of 1 for companies that are based in the United 
States and, as such, potentially affected by SOX when the legislation was introduced in 2002. 
The reference value of zero is reserved for UK-based companies, which are unaffected by SOX.  
 
Marketing Intensity HHI. We use a Herfindahl index of marketing intensity to control for 
changing levels in competitive marketing spending. This industry-level value is calculated as the 
sum of the squares of the shares of marketing intensity by firms i belonging to the same industry 
k (two-digit SIC code) such that:  
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼 𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐻𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 =  ��
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡
𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀 𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡
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Brand Equity. We rely on adjusted revenue premiums as a measure of the firm’s brand equity, 
adapted from the work by Ailawadi, Lehmann, and Neslin (2003). We calculate brand equity as 
follows: 
𝐵𝐵𝑀𝑀𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 = �
(𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 − 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡)
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡
�
𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡
− 𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼 �
(𝐼𝐼𝑀𝑀𝑆𝑆𝑀𝑀𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡 − 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡)
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡
�
𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡
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where i is the focal firm, t is time, and k is the industry in which the focal firm operates. Our 
measure of firm i’s brand equity captures the extent to which that firm is able to extract a price 
premium above the lowest performing firm in the same industry, assuming that the firm with the 
lowest price premium is an appropriate stand-in for generic or unbranded products (Ailawadi, 
Lehmann, and Neslin 2003). The introduction of cost of goods sold in the above formula allows 
us to capture the supplier-side benefits of strong brands (Ailawadi, Lehmann, and Neslin 2003; 
Leone et al. 2006) as well as account for strong brands that might rely on an overall low-cost 
strategy by emphasizing a volume advantage in our calculation.8 
 
Model Development 
Strategic Marketing Emphasis 
We employ a piecewise linear growth model with time-varying covariates using a hierarchical 
multivariate linear modeling (HMLM) approach (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002). This technique is 
appropriate due to (1) its ability to handle nested data, which we make use of by applying our 
final model to a reported 17 years of history for each of the 1,441 firms in our sample (i.e., 
repeated measures for both the IVs and the DV are nested within firm); (2) its ability to function 
in the presence of unbalanced data (not all firms are present for the full 17-year panel); and (3) 
its known application in studies of individual change.  
The piecewise linear model is advantageous in this situation as a tool for structural break 
analysis, allowing us to confirm whether firms altered their investment trajectories as a result of 
the introduction of SOX. In most applications, this approach would lead to the identification of 
                                                 
8 While our overall analysis is restricted to firms with assets above $75 million, as described in the data 
discussion above, this measure was constructed with all firms available in Compustat, such that the MIN 
value of revenue premiums can belong to firms under the $75 million threshold (where SOX is not 
applicable). 
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firm-specific change points (i.e., time intervals that mark a departure for the firm through new 
data generating processes, changes in regimes, etc.). However, given our interest in a naturally 
occurring quasi-experimental shock to our time series, and knowledge of the specific time 
interval for the introduction of SOX (i.e., fiscal year 2002), we can instead check whether the 
1,441 firms in our dataset suffered a structural break in this specific time interval. 
Because strategic marketing emphasis is a time series measure in a panel structure, we 
check whether each firm’s time series in the panel is stationary or evolving using a Fisher-type 
panel unit-root test based on augmented Dickey-Fuller lags (0, 1, and 2) in order to account for 
potentially different autoregressive processes across firms and to handle the unbalanced nature of 
our panel. If the time series is stationary, strategic marketing emphasis can be modeled under its 
natural distribution. However, if it is an evolving time series, it must be first-differenced in order 
to make it stationary, altering the distribution being modeled. Empirically examining this issue, 
our results indicate that all time series in our data demonstrate stationary strategic marketing 
emphasis and follow a normal distribution, meaning that no transformation is necessary.  
The basic form of our model—ignoring controls and moderators—is as follows:  
   Yti = π0i + π1i (Pre-Soxt) + π2i (Post-Soxt) + eti    (3) 
where Yti is the value of the strategic marketing emphasis (SME) measure for firm i at time t, π0i 
represents the firm-specific value of SME at time 0 (which we define as 2002, the year SOX was 
introduced), π1i captures the firm-specific linear annual rate of change in SME over the pre-SOX 
period, and π2i captures the firm-specific post-SOX linear annual rate of change in SME. Last, eti 
is the error component with distribution ~N(0, σ2). 
When the control variables are included, we obtain the following equations: 
Level 1 
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Level 1 represents the time-specific nature of the relationship between SME and the IVs given 
firm i and expanded to account for industry k, with the control variables now included. 
Strategic Marketing Emphasis tik = π0ik + π1ik (Pre-SOXt) + π2ik (Post-SOXt) + π3ik (Pre-
SOXt*USA) + π4ik (Post-SOXt*USA) + π5ik (Firm Sizeti) + π6ik (Debtti) + π7ik 
(EBITti) + π8 (Change in GDP Lagged 1yrt) + π9 (Change in GDP Lagged 2yrst) + 
π10 (Index Return Lagged 1yrt) + π11 (Index Return Lagged 2yrst) + π12 (USA) + etik
 (4) 
where each variable is given at time t for firm i in industry k, and etik is the level 1 error 
component with distribution ~N(0, σ2). 
Level 2 
Level 2 represents the firm level. We model the firm-specific (but time-independent) effects for 
firm i as a combination (for π0ik) of an overall, across-firm average (β00k) plus a random effect 
(r0ik) that represents a firm-specific deviation from its industry average. This firm-specific effect 
on strategic emphasis is partially explained by an autoregressive component of strategic 
emphasis, for t − 1 and t − 2 (β01k and β02k, respectively): 
π0ik = β00k + β01k (SMEt–1ik) + β02k (SMEt–2ik) + r0ik    (5a) 
πqik = βq0k  for q = 1, … , 12     (5b) 
The inclusion of autoregressive components for strategic emphasis allows us to capture 
the path dependency in strategic emphasis and budget allocation within a firm. An average firm 
cannot make immediate adjustments; therefore, leftover investment commitments are partially 
explained by previous levels of investment and allocation priorities. These values are lagged 
twice in order to match the periodicity of our other lagged variables (e.g., Change in GDP and 
Index Returns). 
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Level 3 
Level 3 represents the industry level. We model the industry-specific (but time- and firm-
independent) effects for industry k (on β00k) as a combination of an overall, across-industry 
average (γ000) plus a random effect (u00k) that represents an industry-specific deviation from the 
overall average: 
β00k = γ000 + u00k        (6a) 
βq0k = γq0k  for q = 1, … , 12      (6b) 
 
Marketing Efficiency 
In constructing a model for marketing efficiency, we must take into consideration a number of 
characteristics present in our data, which still conform to the panel structure we presented earlier, 
as well as the distributional characteristics of marketing efficiency. First, and similar to our 
previous model, we account for firm and industry unobserved heterogeneity by using an HMLM 
approach (Raudenbush and Bryk 2002). Second, we check whether marketing efficiency is 
stationary using a panel unit-root test based on augmented Dickey-Fuller (0, 1, and 2) lags. 
Results indicate that all panels in our data have stationary marketing efficiency (p < 0.001), 
meaning that no transformation is necessary. 
However, while marketing efficiency is a continuous, nondiscrete variable, its 
distribution is not normal. Initial analysis revealed that a lognormal transformation of marketing 
efficiency would properly normalize the data. Thus, we have log transformed the marketing 
efficiency dependent variable as the log of Market Efficiency presented earlier. The model for 
marketing efficiency itself follows a similar form to the one presented for strategic marketing 
emphasis, but with some important changes (as noted below, following the equations): 
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Level 1 
Marketing Efficiency tik = π0ik + π1ik (Pre-SOXt) + π2ik (Post-SOXt) + π3ik (Pre-SOXt * USA) 
+ π4ik (Post-SOXt * USA) + π5ik (Marketing Intensity HHI) + π6ik (Marketing 
Intensity HHI * Post-SOXt) + π7ik (Brand Equity) + π8 (Brand Equity * USA) + π9 
(Brand Equity * Post-SOX) + π10 (Brand Equity * Post-SOX * USA) + π11ik (Brand 
Equity2) + π12 (Brand Equity2 * USA) + π13 (Brand Equity2 * Post-SOX) + π14 (Brand 
Equity2 * Post-SOX * USA) + π15ik (Sales Lagged 1yrit) + π16ik (Sales Lagged 2yrsit) 
+ π17 (Change in GDP Lagged 2yrst) + π18 (Index Return Lagged 1yrt) + π19 (Index 
Return Lagged 2yrst) + π20ik (Marketing Intensity) + π21 (USA) + etik              
(7) 
Level 2 
π0ik = β00k + β01k (Pre-SOXt) + β02k (Post-SOXt) + β03k (Brand Equity) + β04k (Marketing 
Intensity) + r0ik         (8a) 
πqik = βq0k  for q = 1, … , 9, 14, 15, 16     (8b) 
Level 3 
β00k = γ000 + γ 001 (Marketing Intensity HHI) + u00k     (9a) 
βqik = γq0k  for q = 1, … , 9, 14, 15, 16     (9b) 
The model for marketing efficiency described in equation (7) incorporates a number of 
new independent variables and controls. First, we include terms for Brand Equity and Brand 
Equity squared as key independent variables. Because firms with greater brand equity may be at 
least partially shielded from the impact of SOX, adding the squared term allows us to capture 
any nonlinearities in this relationship. While we do not formally hypothesize a differential 
impact for very large brands, Luo, Raithel, and Wiles (2013) have shown that increasing brand 
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ratings are also accompanied by a lower dispersion of brand ratings (or higher agreement in 
ratings across consumers) and that this combination increases the “risk-mitigating” effect of 
strong brands. As such, these very large brands might have a multiplicative edge (through higher 
and more consistent value) in buffering the firm from the impact of SOX.  
New controls include the industry-level concentration of marketing intensity in order to 
account for the fact that the efficiency of a firm’s marketing dollars is conditional on competitive 
activity. The lagged values of the firm’s sales are also included because efficiency is a sales-
based measure, and therefore susceptible to inertia-like effects not directly related to the 
marketing efforts we study. 
We also include the firm’s own marketing intensity in the model, since the logic 
presented so far describes the relationship wherein the introduction of SOX alters marketing 
strategic emphasis, causing shifts in the firm’s marketing intensity, and consequently its 
marketing efficiency. However, this is a problematic inclusion for two reasons: (1) marketing 
intensity is used in the construction of our DV, Marketing Efficiency; and (2) intensity is 
endogenous, being that firms could adjust marketing activity as a function of observed or 
expected efficiency of that investment. 
In order to address this issue, we rely on Wooldridge’s (2002) instrumentation approach, 
instrumenting marketing intensity in our model with the residuals of a first-stage regression of 
marketing intensity as a function of all endogenous and exogenous variables present in equation 
(7) as well as two lagged periods of intensity itself. After this instrumentation, a series of Durbin-
Wu-Hausman tests indicates that no variables are endogenous. 
Several interactions are also included in the marketing efficiency model. The interaction 
between Brand Equity, the Post-SOX period, and the USA indicator variable is of particular 
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interest, as it provides a specific contrast of the post-SOX marketing efficiency of firms with 
increasing brand equity, allowing a direct test of H3.  
Finally, new variables are included in the second and third levels of our hierarchical 
model. At the second level, the difference in marketing efficiency between firms is partially 
explained by the introduction of SOX, brand equity, and marketing intensity. Similarly, at the 
third level, the difference in marketing efficiency across industries is partially explained by the 
concentration of marketing intensity in the industry. Note that these variables are also present in 
the first level of the model, as they explain not only differences between firms and industries, but 
also some of the differences in marketing efficiency across time intervals.  
 
Results 
Table 2 reports correlations between the variables in our study. While a number of the IVs are 
correlated at a relatively high level, this is not a major concern, since we are not particularly 
interested in the precise coefficient values, but instead simply want to account for their effects. 
(For example, the Pre-SOX and Post-SOX trend variables are moderately correlated by 
construction. This is a mechanical result of the fact that when Post-SOX = 0, then Pre-SOX will 
generally have a negative value, whereas when Pre-SOX = 0, Post-SOX will generally be 
positive.) 
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Table 2: Correlations between Variables 
 
 Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1. Strategic 
Marketing  
Emphasis 0.16 0.17 
     
    
  
 
2. Marketing 
Efficiency 8.40 45.08 –0.08     
       
3. Pre-SOX –1.71 2.47 –0.07 –0.01           
4. Post-SOX 2.17 2.64 –0.04 –0.01 0.57          
5. Debt 349.42 1896 –0.06 0.01 0.05 0.06         
6. EBIT 541.02 2333 –0.07 0.02 0.05 0.07 0.34        
7. Firm Size 
(Employees  
in Thousands) 12.71 38.40 –0.06 0.01 –0.01 0.00 0.43 0.43 
   
  
 
8. Δ GDP 1yr 13.26 220 0.01 0.01 –0.11 –0.08 –0.01 0.00 –0.01      
9. Δ GDP 2yr 19.30 211 0.01 0.00 –0.06 –0.05 –0.01 0.00 –0.02 0.63     
10. Index Return 
1yr 3015.43 12794 0.09 0.01 0.00 –0.13 –0.04 0.01 –0.08 0.41 0.42   
 
11. Index Return 
2yr 3481.53 11543 0.11 0.02 0.08 –0.01 –0.06 0.01 –0.10 0.16 0.34 0.86  
 
12. Brand Equity 1.40 2.45 0.03 –0.09 0.00 –0.03 –0.02 0.02 –0.04 –0.03 –0.03 –0.06 –0.08  
13. Marketing 
Intensity HHI 0.08 0.16 0.10 0.03 –0.02 0.01 –0.01 0.03 –0.01 0.04 0.07 0.26 0.34 –0.18 
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Strategic Marketing Emphasis 
We used Stata’s mixed models procedure to estimate our models. The coefficient estimates for 
the strategic marketing emphasis models are presented in table 3, along with t-values and 
associated significance levels.  
The null model (model 1) shown in table 3 is a baseline for comparison with more 
complex models. Model 2 adds our five main independent variables, representing the pre- and 
post-SOX growth rates and their interaction with the USA indicator variable. Model 3 adds the 
control variables and represents a significant improvement over model 2 (χ2 (7) = 992.26, p < 
0.001). 9 This model shows a nonsignificant pre-SOX growth rate in strategic marketing 
emphasis for UK-based firms (π1 = −0.0006, n.s.), while their post-SOX growth rate is negative 
and significant (π2 = −0.0022, p < 0.05), highlighting a shift toward increasing R&D investments 
around the introduction of SOX. For American firms, we see a similarly nonsignificant (π3 = 
−0.0015, n.s.) pre-SOX growth rate in strategic marketing emphasis; however, this is followed 
by a positive and significant (π4 = 0.0024, p < 0.05) post-SOX growth rate, indicating an 
increasing relative investment in marketing activities and value appropriation. This represents a 
significant shift in the trend in strategic marketing emphasis between the pre- and post-SOX 
periods relative to the UK control group (χ2 (1) = 28.46, p < 0.001). 
A few of the control variables are also significant. Larger firms appear to invest more 
heavily in R&D (π5 = −0.0001, p < 0.10), although the impact of size given the remainder of our 
controls is small and only marginally significant. Furthermore, American firms on average invest 
more in R&D than their UK counterparts (π12 = −0.0561, p < 0.0001). 
                                                 
9 When one model is a restricted version of another, the reduction in deviance-based criterion (e.g., AIC, BIC) that is 
associated with an increase in the number of independent predictors (reflected in an increase in df) is chi-square 
distributed. We use the difference in the Bayes Information Criterion (BIC) for our tests of model improvement. 
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Table 3: Strategic Marketing Emphasis as a Function of SOX Factors and Controls (N = 17,619) 
 
                                  Model 1: Null       Model 2: Rates of Change        Model 3: Full 
Variable Parameter t-value  Parameter t-value   Parameter   t-value 
Intercept 0.1339 *** 17.54 0.1665 *** 18.18 0.1799 *** 15.97 
Rate of Change Pre-SOX    0.0015  1.59 –0.0006  –0.45 
Rate of Change Post-SOX     –0.0031 *** –5.08 –0.0022 * –2.39 
Rate of Change Pre-SOX in the USA    –0.0037 *** –3.67 –0.0015  –1.09 
Rate of Change Post-SOX in the USA    0.0032 *** 5.08 0.0024 * 2.53 
Company Size        –0.0001 # –1.94 
Debt         –0.0000 *** –4.04 
EBIT         –0.0000  –1.38 
GDP Change Lag 1       –0.0000 *** –4.39 
GDP Change Lag 2       0.0000 *  2.13 
Index Return Lag 1       0.0000 * 2.13 
Index Return Lag 2       –0.0000 *** –3.28 
USA    –0.0452 *** –7.31 –0.0561 *** –6.20 
Random Effects    
 
 
Residual (level 1) (etik) 0.0020 *** 76.06 0.0020 *** 3.49 0.0020 *** 3.49 
Firm (level 2) (r0ik) 0.0068 *** 12.36 0.0062 *** 12.42 0.0058 *** 16.54 
     SME – Lag 1 (r1ik) 0.3267 *** 16.66 0.3127 *** 16.51 0.3097 *** 7.57 
     SME – Lag 2 (r2ik) 0.0304 *** 8.31 0.0292 *** 8.24 0.0267 *** 12.23 
Industry (level 3) (u00k) 0.0022 *** 3.54 0.0022 *** 76.11 0.0021 ** 74.52 
AIC –42353.26 –42338.46 –41448.51  
BIC –42285.06 –42282.37 –41290.11   
DF 9 14           21         
 
Notes: *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05, # p < .10. 
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All of the included random effects shown near the bottom of table 3 for all three models 
are significant, reinforcing the appropriateness of using a hierarchical modeling structure, since 
these significant effects indicate unexplained variance at all three levels. Furthermore, by 
splitting the error term into temporal, firm, and industry components, we are able to determine 
how much of the variance in strategic marketing emphasis is explained by each level. According 
to model 3, strategic marketing emphasis variance is split into 19.8 percent temporal (level 1, 
etik), 57.09 percent firm-specific (level 2, r0ik), and 23.1 percent industry-specific variance 
components (level 3, u00k). Finally, the inclusion of lagged values for strategic emphasis is also 
validated by the results in table 3, as both the first and second lags are positive and significant 
across all of our models, meaning that the differences in strategic emphasis across firms in any 
given time are largely explained by each firm’s previous strategic emphasis (i.e., we are correctly 
accounting for path dependency: the fact that firms cannot shift immediately, but are instead 
constrained somewhat by previous decisions).  
As noted earlier, the pre-SOX period exhibits a null rate of change in strategic marketing 
emphasis for both US- and UK-based firms, indicating that prior to the introduction of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley law, firms were stable in their allocation decision between value creation 
(research and development) and value appropriation (marketing spending intensity) investments. 
In contrast, during the post-SOX period, the American annual rate of change is significant, 
indicating that the average American firm shifted its strategic emphasis toward increasing 
marketing investments and value appropriation. (As the United Kingdom serves as our control 
group, we must account for this main effect, −0.0022 plus the differential provided by American 
firms, .0024, which gives us a post-SOX net effect for American firms of .0002, χ2 (1) = 13.09, p 
< 0.01). This post-SOX shift supports H1. It is important to note that those firms that were not 
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subject to SOX (i.e., the UK-based firms) exhibited an opposite behavior by increasingly 
emphasizing value creation, something that we argued as being riskier and discouraged by the 
SOX legislation, perhaps as an opportunistic move against the more restricted American 
counterparts that now face a higher relative cost for risky investments. 
 
Marketing Efficiency 
Table 4 shows the results of our model of marketing efficiency. First, the rate of change in the 
pre-SOX period for UK firms is negative and significant (π1 = −0.0148, p < 0.01) but is followed 
by a positive and significant rate of change in efficiency in the post-SOX period (π2 = 0.0141, 
p < 0.01). This is consistent with the results seen in strategic emphasis, where an average shift in 
emphasis toward value creation should mean less pressure and competition in the marketing 
arena and subsequently a greater return to marketing investments. Conversely, for American 
firms, we see a positive but nonsignificant change in efficiency in the pre-SOX period (π3 = 
0.0086, n.s.), followed by a negative and significant rate of change in marketing efficiency in the 
post-SOX period (π4 = −0.0140, p < 0.01). Once again, this represents a significant shift in the 
trend between the pre- and post-SOX periods relative to the UK control group (χ2 (1) = 4.39, 
p < 0.05), providing empirical support for H2. The overall effect of SOX on the firm’s marketing 
efficiency will also depend on the firm’s brand equity, marketing intensity, and industry-wide 
marketing conditions, as described below. 
Looking at the impact of brand equity, we see that there is a differential relative to the 
country in question, with UK firms having less efficient marketing with increasing brand equity 
(π7 = −0.0799, p < 0.001) as measured by price premiums, and their American counterparts 
observing no advantage in efficiency due to brand equity (π8 = 0.0729, p < 0.001, and relative to  
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Table 4: Model of Marketing Efficiency 
 
Variable  Parameter t-value 
Intercept 1.8457 *** 28.00 
Rate of Change Pre-SOX –0.0148 ** –2.64 
Rate of Change Post-SOX 0.0141 ** 2.96 
Rate of Change Pre-SOX in the USA 0.0086  1.43 
Rate of Change Post-SOX in the USA –0.0140 ** –2.86 
Marketing Intensity HHI 0.4341 *** 5.07 
Marketing Intensity HHI Post-SOX –0.0298 *** –3.36 
Brand Equity –0.0799 *** –4.61 
Brand Equity in the USA 0.0729 *** 4.02 
Brand Equity Post-SOX 0.0009  0.69 
Brand Equity Post-SOX in the USA –0.0059 *** –3.52 
Brand Equity2 0.0002  1.09 
Brand Equity2 in the USA –0.0017  –0.79 
Brand Equity2 Post-SOX in the USA 0.0002 ** 2.98 
Sales Lag 1 0.0000 *** 6.07 
Sales Lag 2 –0.0000  –1.61 
GDP Change Lag 1 0.0000 # 1.51 
GDP Change Lag 2 –0.0000  –0.80 
Index Return Lag 1 0.0000  1.32 
Index Return Lag 2 0.0000  0.76 
Marketing Intensity (instrumented) 1.8793 *** 17.90 
USA –0.0579  –1.30 
Random Effects 
 
Residual (level 1) (etik) 0.0128  *** 59.51 
Firm (level 2) (r0ik) 0.3541 *** 19.02 
Pre-SOX (r1ik) 0.0022 *** 13.21 
Post-SOX (r2ik) 0.0017 *** 15.94 
Brand Equity (r3ik) 0.0076 *** 6.70 
Marketing Intensity (r4ik) 9.0852 *** 18.85 
Industry (level 3) (u00k) 0.0809 *** 3.03 
Marketing Intensity HHI (u1ik) 0.1177 * 2.02 
AIC  –6215 
BIC  –5920 
DF  40 
 
the reference group a χ2 (1) = 1.55, p = 0.21. However, we have a greater interest in the impact of 
SOX on this relationship. In the post-SOX period, we see a negative impact of brand equity on 
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marketing efficiency for American firms (π10 = −0.0059, p < 0.001), indicating that SOX hurt the 
marketing efficiency of high equity brands even more, which is counter to what we predicted in 
hypothesis 3. The hypothesized protective effect of strong brands is actually only true for the 
larger values of brand equity, as shown in the quadratic term (π11 = 0.0002, p < 0.001), providing 
evidence that the relationship between a firm’s brand equity and its ability to insulate itself from 
legislative shocks like SOX is more nuanced than expected, only partially supporting H3. 
The model also suggests that functioning within an industry with a high concentration of 
marketing intensity (i.e., with the bulk of marketing investment coming from few members of 
the industry, and arguably low noise) provides a large improvement for a firm’s marketing 
efficiency (π5 = 0.4341, p < 0.001), but it further suggests that this advantage was reduced in the 
post-SOX period (π6 = −0.0298, p < 0.001). This is consistent with the argument that new firms 
enter this marketing competition and increase their share of voice in the post-SOX period, thus 
decreasing the value of marketing concentration and the advantage garnered by it. In fact, a 
check in mean industry marketing intensity concentration before and after SOX does show a 
statistically significant decrease (t = 2.008, p = 0.0223). Furthermore, marketing intensity is 
positive and significant (π10 = 1.8793, p < 0.001), showing that firms investing the most heavily 
in marketing are likely the ones that can extract the greatest returns from this investment (i.e., 
they are more efficient users of their marketing budgets). 
 
Robustness Checks 
Alternative Control Group 
In order to test whether the effects found so far in our study can be attributed to Sarbanes-Oxley, 
we make use of the law’s selective application by replicating our study for US firms having less 
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than $75 million in assets. Under the provisions of SOX, these firms are exempt from this 
specific regulation. The resulting growth rates are shown in figure 1, both for the original sample 
of SOX-compliant firms and this new sample of smaller firms. The exempt (small) firms have 
nonsignificant growth rates in strategic marketing emphasis for both periods surrounding the 
introduction of SOX (pre-SOX, π1 = 0.003, p = 0.242; post-SOX, π2 = −0.001, p = 0.161), 
indicating that the average small firm remained unchanged in its allocation of resources between 
R&D and marketing across the entire 17-year period (i.e., nonsignificant, or zero growth rate 
prior to, and following SOX). This is markedly different from the pattern for those firms required 
to comply with SOX legislation (as shown in our main study) and supports our contention that 
SOX itself has had a substantial impact on firms’ strategic marketing emphases. 
 
Figure 1: Strategic Marketing Emphasis Growth Rates for Firms Affected by SOX 
Compared to Those Not Affected by SOX  
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Figure 2: Marketing Intensity and R&D Growth Rates as Components of Strategic 
Marketing Emphasis, Surrounding the Introduction of SOX in 2002 
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previous trend and began to invest in marketing more heavily (positive growth rate π2ik = 0.0004, 
p < 0.05). Combining these findings with the results reported earlier, along with the effects of 
SOX reported in other published studies, we can conclude that firm strategy changed in response 
to SOX, not just due to risk-averse reductions in R&D, but also due to simultaneous increases in 
marketing investments. 
 
Discussion 
The purpose of our study is to examine the potential benefit of strong brands as a buffer against 
negative consequences of unanticipated environmental shifts. We do so by considering the 
imposition of new legislations as a systematic shock that significantly alters a firm’s business 
environment, either by imposing new restrictions or by altering the cost/payoff structure that 
firms face. We then suggest that firms respond in a homogenous manner due to mandatory 
compliance and equal application of the law’s incentives/disincentives for all firms falling under 
the new regulation. We hypothesize that this homogeneity in action reduces the efficiency of 
marketing investments, except for firms that have existing strong brands. We then test our 
hypotheses, focusing on the impact of the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, a 
significant piece of legislation with firm-level consequences but without marketing-specific 
provisions. 
As predicted, we find that, on average, firms shifted their investment trajectories toward 
value appropriation activities and away from value creation following the introduction of SOX in 
2002. Interestingly, our further analysis of the components of firms’ strategic marketing 
emphasis indicates that while the relative intensity of marketing spending was fairly stable prior 
to the introduction of SOX, the introduction of additional risk into the environment immediately 
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changed this, leading to greater investment in marketing. This important insight highlights that 
changes in firm strategy after the introduction of Sarbanes-Oxley are not driven solely by already 
known and expected cuts to riskier R&D investments, but also by a growing reliance on 
marketing activity as a means to manage this increase in the firm’s risk exposure. 
We further show that the concentration of marketing investment across industries 
diminished after the introduction of SOX, as more firms entered the advertising space and/or 
increased their marketing budgets (in line with the overall shift toward increased marketing 
spending and greater value appropriation noted previously). This change in the landscape was 
accompanied by a decrease in firms’ marketing efficiency, as they found their activities to be less 
effective. However, those firms that had created the largest values of brand equity prior to the 
introduction of SOX were found to maintain their marketing efficiency better than those firms 
that had made no such investment. 
Thus, this study adds to the extensive literature on the advantages of strong brands. More 
specifically, it adds to the much smaller subset of studies highlighting the role of brands as a 
buffer against negative consequences, whether firm specific (e.g., a product recall or a service 
failure) or a broad-based environmental shift like the one examined here. 
This is also the first study in marketing to consider the impact of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
of 2002 itself and its implications for US firms, both in terms of strategy-setting and the 
accompanying consequences to marketing performance (i.e., the efficiency of marketing 
investments). The discussion surrounding this event has been rich and contentious within the 
accounting and finance literatures, highlighting how the environment has become riskier since 
July 2002, but its implications for marketing have not previously been explored. Our study 
contributes to this growing domain by introducing marketing consequences, such as increased 
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marketing investment and loss of efficiency, to the implications of SOX for American firms. 
Furthermore, by considering legislative change as an influencing factor on firms’ strategic 
marketing choice between value creation and value appropriation activities, we also answer the 
call set forth by Mizik and Jacobson (2003) to explore conditions leading firms to significantly 
shift their strategic emphases.  
 
Managerial Implications 
What do these findings mean for firms and their managers? First, managers need to be concerned 
about compliance with changing legislation and think strategically about its implications for both 
their own firms and for their key competitors. The importance of such legislation for marketing 
comes from three primary characteristics of this landscape-altering force: (1) it is coercive, in 
that all firms under its coverage must comply; (2) compliance is required in the short term; and 
(3) the applicability of new laws can be targeted rather than universal (e.g., SOX applies to a 
subset of American firms). Taken together, these characteristics mean that a firm facing new 
legislation will also observe rapid changes in competitor behavior, although not necessarily from 
every competing firm or across all markets where the firm operates. 
For instance, the imposition of SOX has changed how managers think of the boundaries 
of their firms. Many directors have increasingly looked to outsource risky projects and shrink 
internal R&D operations (i.e., value-creation activities). Many have even considered going 
private (Engel, Hayes, and Wang 2007) or “going dark” (i.e., deregistering their stock; Leuz, 
Triantis, and Wang 2008). As a result, managers who have been able to manage outsourcing 
activities or who have been adept at managing merger and acquisition opportunities should thrive 
in this new environment as firms that limit internal R&D investments look for new ways to 
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benefit from value creation done externally. These conditions also provide one incentive toward 
the formation of networked entities, where a number of allied but independent firms coordinate 
toward a common goal. As such, the firm’s ability to identify, manage, and leverage such value 
networks could be incrementally more valuable in a time of change due to legislative influence. 
Furthermore, SOX exemplifies the potentially uneven application of the law since it 
targets larger firms (>$75 million) in the United States. Our research shows that this targeting 
drives a shift in large firms from value creation to value appropriation. At the same time, it 
creates opportunities for both foreign (UK) and smaller (< $75 million) firms that are willing to 
take on riskier projects, since these firms are not required to comply with SOX. In the longer 
term, niche firms may be able to tap into new growth opportunities because they are small and 
face less onerous regulation. As for large firms, R&D investment may dichotomize, with most 
firms deemphasizing internal R&D while other firms evolve into compliance specialists that are 
able to adapt to shifting institutional risks.  
It is possible that in this new, post-SOX environment, US firms are trading away their 
future (R&D) for immediate gains (advertising), jeopardizing their future as well as the well-
being of all of their stakeholders (suppliers, employees, customers) and shareholders (e.g., 
Rubera and Tellis 2014). SOX may also make US firms vulnerable to innovative foreign 
competitors that can leverage their size without having to comply with or face a riskier 
environment created by SOX.  
It is also worth considering that the introduction of new legislation like SOX could 
function as a homogenizing force in the marketplace. In equilibrium, firms will seek to maximize 
their individual goals (e.g., profit, sales, market share, etc.) given their individual resources, 
capability constraints, and market conditions. And while the firm’s individual resources and 
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capabilities allow it to differentiate itself, the market provides an opposite force, where specific 
conditions might call for similar strategic responses, thus forcing firms to move closer together. 
Our results conform to this view, given the movement of firms toward greater emphasis on value 
appropriation and heavier advertising spending in general in response to the riskier environment 
created by SOX. While individual differences between firms will still allow for differentiation in 
deployment and execution of similar strategies, managers need to be aware that the impact of this 
increased strategic competition will reduce their firms’ return on marketing investment.  
With the introduction of SOX, firms invested more heavily in marketing initiatives, and 
our results confirm that, on average, firms experienced a lower return on marketing spending 
following the introduction of SOX (i.e., reduced efficiency), primarily due to the increased 
competition for share of voice. Interestingly, this loss in efficiency was partially mitigated for 
firms able to leverage preexisting brand equity in order to fight off the incursion of increased 
advertising spending. This result highlights the power of brand-building strategies available to 
marketing managers and their ability to maintain firm differentiation in the face of homogenizing 
forces, allowing managers to make one additional argument for their often-threatened advertising 
budgets: the creation of brand equity through brand-based advertising can create a protective tool 
against unforeseen increases in environmental risk. However, it is also important to note that this 
protective effect may only exist for very strong brands. 
 
Research Implications 
Marketing researchers have traditionally focused primarily on industry-based competition and on 
how companies utilize their firm-specific resources, while largely neglecting the institutional 
conditions that firms face. However, our work shows that these conditions can have a profound 
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impact on firm strategy as well as on the value of brands as protective barriers to competitive 
actions. Furthermore, they have the potential to influence both the firm’s competitive setting and 
the nature of the resources that provide it with advantage. Thus, more work is needed that looks 
at how marketing is affected by institutional constraints. 
The strategic marketing emphasis of the firm, or the resource allocation decision between 
marketing efforts and R&D investments, is a key variable of interest for marketing researchers 
interested in exploring firm and marketing performance. The understanding that emphasis can be 
shifted due to institutional pressure rather than through agency alone can add nuance and further 
understanding to studies exploring the impact of firms’ strategic emphases.  
Furthermore, this institutional interference provides a serious challenge for firms 
attempting to achieve and maintain ambidexterity, or the simultaneous pursuit of both value 
creation and value appropriation. Ambidexterity has been shown to be important in the 
profitability of larger firms (Voss and Voss 2013)—that is, those specifically targeted by SOX. 
As noted in the managerial implications discussion, corporate responses to SOX will continue to 
evolve, and their strategic emphases will shift. At the same time, the differences between larger 
and smaller companies are likely to further diverge. It will therefore be important to track firms’ 
responses over time. 
On a positive note, the relative strategic emphasis on value appropriation has been shown 
to improve customer satisfaction (Song, Vadakkepatt, and Lehmann 2012), given the three roles 
of advertising identified in past research: persuasion, information, and prestige (Bagwell 2007) 
and the increased utility consumers derive from the prestige associated with the brands they use. 
As such, these institutional pressures might lead to greater short-term performance (both in terms 
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of marketing satisfaction and financial gains), but at a potential cost to long-term survival, as 
noted earlier. 
 
Conclusion 
Brands have been shown not only to enhance the outcome of positive marketing initiatives, but 
also to mitigate the downside consequences of negative forces. Hunt and Morgan (1995) suggest 
that new laws have the capacity to provide such a negative force on marketing practice, yet 
marketing scholars know surprisingly little about how major new legislation affects marketing. 
Institutional theory suggests that managers (and firms) will adapt quickly to the introduction of 
such laws (e.g., Scott 1997). However, few studies have examined marketing responses to new 
legislation, or discussed how marketing assets can help the firm navigate new environments. 
In this paper, we have focused on how firms have responded to one such legislative 
imposition, the introduction of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. SOX has influenced how boards 
evaluate and respond to the perceived risks of various business options, resulting in a systematic 
shift across firms away from value creation in favor of more value appropriation. This happened 
in a homogenous manner, thereby reducing firms’ marketing efficiency, with the exception of 
those firms having the strongest of brands. What the legislation means exactly for everyday 
marketing practice (e.g., pricing, advertising) is not yet clear, but it seems likely that marketers 
will prefer to support and promote well-established brands over radical new products. In the 
short term, this preference will maximize cash flow (Srivastava, Shervani, and Fahey 1998), but 
the longer-term performance consequences of this stance are likely to be less satisfactory. 
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